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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the following pages, three well-known Latinoamericanists
share their views on the current prospects for coups in Latin
America. They are: Rut Diamint of the University
Torcuatto de Tella in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Pablo
Policzer of the University of Calgary in Canada; and Michael
Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC.
Each looks at the potential for coups from different
perspectives but, all three come to similar conclusions. That
is, that despite substantial gains in democracy, the threat of
coups in Latin America remains latent.
The authors agree that democracy is growing in the region.
Opinion surveys such as the Americas Barometer
consistently show that citizens in Latin America have
gradually incorporated democracy as part of their core value
system. Yet, the authors argue convincingly that Latin
America faces new types of interruptions to its democratic
process that should be considered coups, even if not
following the traditional style of military coup that
predominated in the past. Situations that have taken place in
Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras and other countries
serve to illustrate the new trends.
More specifically, Professor Diamint argues that in Latin
America a culture of intolerance, demonization of the
opposition, and the utilization of any method to achieve
power prevails. In a region with a very high threshold of
violence, governments fail to set an example of establishing
a culture of debate, consensus, and transparency. This
culture is inclined to uncontrollable political expressions,
preferring confrontational means to resolve conflict. Within
this scenario, ―messianic‖ solutions are promoted and coups
cannot be discarded as an option that would never transpire.
Professor Policzer looks more closely to the constitutional
loopholes that allow for a transformation of limited into
1

absolute power. He argues that coups can be constitutional
or unconstitutional, and that a constitutional coup can occur
when violations to democracy actually stem from the
constitutions themselves. In Honduras, for example, specific
provisions in the constitution itself created conditions for a
constitutional crisis; similar provisions have also led to
constitutional authoritarianism in Venezuela and other
countries. Dr. Policzer stresses that when a head of state or
the military take absolute power, even temporarily, based on
provisions in their constitutions; they are in essence staging a
constitutional coup. These blind spots in constitutions, he
argues, may be a more serious threat to democracy than that
of traditional coups.
Lastly, Dr. Shifter argues that some kind of coup should be
expected in Latin America in coming years, not only because
fundamental institutions remain weak in some countries, but
because the regional political environment is less prepared to
respond effectively to transgressions than it was a few years
ago. The good news, however, is that only a handful of
countries are at risk, and that the militaries, even in those
countries, show no interest in governing. The bad news is
that in those few countries where situations are indeed shaky,
they are also in some cases aggravated by rising food and
fuel prices, and spreading criminality, which pose serious
risks to the rule of law and democratic governance.
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A new era of coup d’états in
Latin america?
Prof. Rut Diamint
University torcuatto de tella (argentina)
The third wave of democracy had a positive impact on Latin
America. Since 1979, when Ecuador put an end to its
traditional coup d’états, a domino effect occurred as various
countries experienced transitions from authoritarian regimes
to democracies, with Chile in 1990 closing that cycle. The
June 2009, coup in Honduras ended the predominant belief
that this form of political rupture had been eliminated in the
region.
It is true that prior to this, several governments experienced
hurdles that many feared heralded the beginnings of despotic
reversals, such as in Haiti (June 1988 and September 1991);
Peru (April 1992); Venezuela (led by Hugo Chavez in 1992);
Guatemala (May 1993); Paraguay (April 1996) and
Venezuela (2002). These events, in one hand, ascribed the
instability to the inability of democracy to flourish in these
countries, as happened with the abrupt end of governments
in Ecuador (1997, 2000, 2005); in Argentina (2001); and in
Bolivia (2003 and 2005). Yet, these events were handled
within institutional frameworks that also allowed observers
to reaffirm that Latin American democracies were relatively
strong. This was so because the countries re-established
political practices within the norms of their respective
systems. Even pessimistic observers argued that the
constitutional violations of the past were no longer a viable
alternative. Nevertheless, they took place again in Honduras
and later in Ecuador. Thus, it is worth to ask if we are
witnessing the beginning of a new cycle of institutional
ruptures. Several governments are promoting social and
3

political discord, which could lead to breakdowns and
dangerous confrontations that would threaten democratic
regimes. Then, are we facing a new era of coup d’états?
DEFINING THE TERMS
The French term coup d’état refers to a violent and illegal
action used by a ruler to concentrate power and deny it from
his enemies. The concept was first used in 18th century
France to characterize a series of measures taken by the king
outside of any legislative procedural requirements and was
justified by the need to preserve the security of the state or
common welfare of its citizens. In the 19 th century, it still
referred to actions carried out by a chief of government to
increase his power or control Parliament. That is why it is
also referred to as ―palace coups‖ or ―institutional coups‖.
Napoleon Bonaparte‘s 18 Brumaire‘s coup has been
considered as the beginning of the modern coup d’état.
Although Bonaparte carried a palace coup, he gave the term
new meaning when he relied on the support of the military.
Curzio Malaparte, in his classic work on coup d’états,
pointed out that for Napoleon ―the art of conquering power
was an essentially military art: the strategies and tactics of
war applied to political struggle.‖ 1 From there on the coup
d’état model changed; since the 20th century its definition
evolved into rebellions led by military personnel or civilians
allied with the armed forces.
The abrupt and illegal takeover by the Armed Forces and its
allies has been common throughout Latin American history.
As Narcis Serra reminds us, ―A common characteristic of all
Latin American countries is that the transition to democracy
took place, without exceptions, from military regimes.‖ 2
1

Curzio Malaparte (1934) Técnica del Golpe de Estado (Santiago, Chile,
Editorial Zig-Zag), p. 95.
2
Narcis Serra i Serra, ―El estado: papel de las fuerzas armadas y de
seguridad. Notas sobre su control democrático,‖ Instituto Interamericano
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Yet, there is also a modern version of the coup d’état. It is
characterized by the use of violence by authoritarian regimes
against its own citizens. These regimes attempt to annul
political expression, monopolize the media, impose
ideologies, utilize the secret police to spy on people and use
illegal means to neutralize enemies.
The prologue of Curzio Malaparte‘s book on coup d‘états
contains a phrase that is as valid today as it was in 1931. His
goal was to examine ―the struggle between the defenders of
the principles of freedom and democracy -in other words- the
defenders of the parliamentary state and its enemies.‖ 3
Today, we could retranslate these precepts as a struggle
between republican democracy and plebiscitary democracy.
Now ruptures and instability are more similar to palace coup
d’états than previous ones and also are the result of eclectic
alliances with more sophisticated forms of concentration of
power.
OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES?
To analyze whether we are facing new forms of institutional
breakdowns or in reality, witnessing a new cycle of the old
coups from the past, we will examine the case of Honduras.
Whether or not a coup d’état took place in Honduras in
2009, generated multiple discussions. There is enough
evidence that proves that it was a coup. Among them, the
search-warrant ordered by the Supreme Court charging
President Manuel Zelaya for abuse of authority, crimes
against the government and treason against the fatherland,
was never found. Also, the siege to the Brazilian Embassy
was a clear violation of immunities and guarantees
established by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.
de Derechos Humanos, s/f,
htttp://www.iidh.ed.cr/comunidades/seguridad/docs/seg_docfuerzas/el%2
0estado%20el%20papel%20de%20las%20faaa.pdf. p. 1.
3
Curzio Malaparte, Técnica del Golpe de Estado, p. 5.
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In documents disclosed by Wikileaks, the U.S. Ambassador
in Tegucigalpa, Hugo Llorens, reported to his government
that: ―The position of the Embassy is that, without any
doubts, the military, the Supreme Court of Justice and the
National Congress conspired on June 28th in what constitutes
an illegal and unconstitutional coup against the Executive
power, although it could be argued that Zelaya could have
acted illegally and violated the Constitution… It was a coup
d’état against the Executive power. At the same time, we
have no doubts that the coming to power by Roberto
Micheletti was illegitimate.‖4
In addition, Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression from the United Nations, pointed
out on his report: ―Free demonstrations by those who
opposed the coup d’état and demand the return of President
Zelaya are not allowed, they are immediately confronted
with direct repressive mechanisms by security forces.‖ 5
Moreover, he added: ―Cameramen and photographers who
would like to document the events have been a specific
target of police aggression, suffering blows, confiscation
and/or destruction of their cameras or filmed footage.
Several of them personally showed me the physical evidence
of bruises on their bodies.‖6 These independent expressions
leave no doubts as to the authoritarian and repressive nature
of the government which forcefully replaced Zelaya.

4

―Brasil y golpe de Estado en Honduras, entre filtraciones de
Wikileaks‖, El Tiempo, (Bogotá, January 12, 2011); ―Wikileaks filtró
texto que revela que EU consideró ilegal golpe en Honduras,‖
Univisión.com, (New York, November 29, 2010).
5
Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Speech, Special Report on Freedom
of Opinion and Speech of the United Nations Organization, Press
Release on the visit to Honduras by Rapporteur, United Nations
Organizations, August 10, 2009, pp.1-2.
6
Idem, p. 2.
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Others who did not want to characterize the ousting of
President Manuel Zelaya as a coup, offered superficial
explanations. For example, Jorge Salaverry, former
Ambassador and visiting research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation, argued: ―By the midterm of his presidency,
Zelaya began to take a surprisingly turn to the populist left
that raised red flags within his party, a traditional right wing
party, and triggered concerns from Hondurans in general.‖ 7
Still, Salaverry failed to point out that in a democracy,
suffrage is the method to punish those who betray a party or
citizens.
Nonetheless, Ambassador Salaverry is correct in adding an
important point to the debate regarding current political
processes in various Latin American countries. He refers to a
decree issued by President Zelaya on June 25, 2009 that
called for a national referendum on June 28 to ask the
following question: ―Do you agree with adding a fourth
ballot box for the 2009 general elections which will allow
the people to decide on calling for a National Constituent
Assembly?‖ Salaverry explains the intentions behind this
apparent way of exercising direct democracy.8 This leads
into the debate between representative democracy and
plebiscitary democracy.
In a plebiscitary democracy, a leader, supported by a
political apparatus, seeks direct links to the people,
weakening the role of institutions. In these situations, the
leader-- who already became a caudillo-- is elected on a
personal platform and entrusted with all power. Other actors
or institutions are neglected and only the people give
legitimacy to his power.9 But, citizens do not express
7

Jorge Salaverry ―Honduras: Golpe de Estado, u Homenaje a
Montesquieu?‖ Fundación Ciudadanía y Valores, September, 2009.p. 4.
8
Idem, p. 6.
9
Catherine Conaghan and Carlos de la Torre ―The Permanent
Campaign of Rafael Correa: Making Ecuador‘s Plebiscitary Presidency,‖
in The International Journal of Press/Politics, 2008, 13 (3) pp. 267-284;
Aníbal Pérez-Liñan, Juicio político al presidente y nueva
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themselves through established constitutional channels;
instead, they do it through inorganic and noninstitutionalized movements. These combinations of strong
presidents within weak institutional contexts could be one of
the main threats to liberal and pluralist democracy. In many
occasions, the coup is heralded as a natural exit process to
the continuous mistakes committed by a head of state. The
coup participants claim to be saviors of the national identity:
Messiahs claiming to embody popular will and interpret it
according to their personal interests.
In contrast, a democratic state of rule of law calls for
effective monopoly of violence but to not use it in an
arbitrary manner, but submit it to the laws and regulations.
Violence (and to take the president, wearing pajamas at
night, out of the country is without any doubts an act of
political violence) is an attack against existing norms. The
lukewarm critique of some countries, the limited scope of
action available to multilateral organizations and the
subsequent oblivion of this political drama -in other wordsthe refusal to denounce the coup d’état and to act
accordingly, is a terrible precedent for the Panamerican
community. Although the assault on power that deviated
from institutionalized norms was recognized, failing to act
effectively had and will have a high cost when attempting to
avoid similar antidemocratic adventures in the future.
POLITICAL DETERIORATION AND LEGITIMACY
We have witnessed other forms of political violations that
represent forebodings regarding Latin American democratic
systems. As Juan Linz explained in 1978, legitimacy is
strengthened by the personal charisma of a leader, but what
counts is the legitimacy given by laws and state institutions
institucionalidad política en América Latina (Buenos Aires: Fondo de
Cultura Económica, 2009); Carlos de la Torre y Enrique Peruzzotti, El
retorno del pueblo: Populismo y nuevas democracias en América Latina
(Quito: FLACSO/Ecuador y Ministerio de Cultura, 2008).
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which guarantee obedience by subordinates.10 In de facto
governments, this obedience is achieved through the armed
forces monopoly on the use of force. But, what happens
when legitimacy is almost exclusively achieved through a
patronage system? Could we understand the attempted 2010
coup d’état in Ecuador in these terms?
The Ecuadorian police became a powerful agency, involved
in many areas beyond its exclusive responsibility such as
transit, customs, migration, and drug trafficking. It
eventually achieved economic power similar to the Armed
Forces. The police became a political actor.11 Its claims
seemed to be linked to sinecures and benefits.
The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
(CONAIE) and the Pachakutik Bloc that represents
indigenous and peasant groups issued a statement rejecting
the idea of a coup d’état. Given its history and broad level of
representation, they deserve to be taken into account: “We
energetically affirmed that there was never an attempted
coup d’état, even less an abduction, but an event that
responded to mistaken policies by the government which
results in popular discontent, due to the permanent
aggressions, discrimination and violations of human rights
granted through Constitutional norms.”12 In another
paragraph, they added: “We do not recognize ‘this dictatorial
democracy,’ due to its lack of freedom of expression, the
abduction of all state powers by the executive in its political
system of one government, which does not generate spaces
to discuss bills elaborated by indigenous movements and
10

Juan Linz, La quiebra de las democracias (Madrid, Alianza Editorial,
1987), pp. 37-40.
11
Hernán Ramos, “La política como nuevo actor político,” Clarín
(Buenos Aires), October 1, 2010.
12
“CONAIE; El supuesto golpe de estado, la democracia y las
organizaciones indígenas,” Quito, October 6, 2010.
htttp://nasaacin.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1
027:conaie-el-supuesto-golpe-de-estado-lademocracia-y-lasorganizaciones-indígenas&catid=:noticias-generales&itemid=84.
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other social sectors.‖13 The dilemma of the legitimacy of a
leader or of laws and state institutions as pointed out by Linz
reappears.
The international reaction in defense of democracy was
quick and forceful. In a matter of hours, the Permanent
Council of the Organization of American States (OAS)
called for a meeting, and five presidents of UNASUR met in
Buenos Aires to support the Ecuadorian democracy,
although it was never confirmed whether a coup d’état had
taken place. It was evident that challenges to institutions
through illegal acts, such as the closing of the international
airport carried out by government officials and members of
the military, received severe international sanctions.14 It was
also evident that conflicts are still solved through arbitrary
means, resulting in injuries and deaths.
Actions framed in this same type of resistance against
governments have taken place in other countries of the
region. Bolivian president, Evo Morales, also denounced an
attempted coup d’état at the United Nations General
Assembly, declaring that: ―I want my fellow presidents to
know that last year there was also an attempted coup d’état
in Bolivia. Thanks to labor unions and the participation of
the international community, especially of UNASUR, we
were able to stop this civilian, not military, coup d’état in my
country. Around this time last year in September [2008], a
coup d’état failed.‖15 In reality, the Bolivian president has
denounced his opponents as participants in coup d’états on
various occasions. The first time was in 2003 when some
governors rebelled against Morales‘ orders. The situation
was repeated in 2008 when he accused ―fascist and terrorist
paramilitary groups‖ of the prefectures and civic committees
13

Idem.
―Golpe de Estado en Ecuador?,‖ Reporte Confidencial, El Semanario,
October 10-17, 2010. 153.
15
Speech by Mr. Evo Morales Ayma, President of Bolivia, during the
general debate at the 64th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly, September 23, 2009.
14
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of the so called Half Moon region (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni
and Pando) for carrying out an atypical coup d’état.16
Morales also accused the Spanish Popular Party of
supporting a coup d’état against his government through a
foundation (FAES) in Bolivia.17
Argentina‘s president also spoke about an attempted coup
when referring to the showdown with his country‘s rural
sectors in 2008. President Cristina Fernández said: ―I have
seen again the face of a past that seems to be wanting to
return…This time they have not come accompanied by
tanks, this time they have been accompanied by some
multimedia ‗generals‘, who in addition to supporting the
lockout of the people, have carried out a lockout of
information by changing, twisting and showing only one
side.‖18 Her Minister of Economics, Amado Boudou, said
that the government of President Fernández suffered two
attempted coup d’états. The first one with Resolution 125
(retention of agricultural goods in 2008) and the second one
with the struggle over the Central Bank reserves, during the
summer of 2010, when they wanted the state to increase its
debt. 19
In Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega submitted an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Justice, claiming legal inequality in
order to request the annulment of a law preventing him from
running for the presidency, again on the basis that the
Constitution violated his rights as a citizen. After three
16

Rosa Rojas, ―En Bolivia, en marcha un golpe de estado atípico,
denuncia Evo Morales,‖ El Universal, (Mexico), September 11, 2010.
17
―Morales acusa en Madrid al PP de estar detrás de un golpe de Estado
en Bolivia,‖ El Mundo, (Madrid, Spain), May 18, 2010.
18
Ernesto Tenenbaum, ―Verguenza ajena,‖ Revista Veintitrés, (Buenos
Aires), May 6, 2010; ―Cristina Kirchner relaciona a los huelguistas con el
golpe de Estado de 1976,‖ Diario Público, (Madrid), April 2, 2008.
19
―Dos intentos de Golpe de Estado,‖ La política on line, (Buenos
Aires), Septermber 9, 2010,
http://www.lapoliticaonline.com/noticias/val/67913/dos-intentos -degolpe-de-estado-.html.
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judges of the opposition of the Constitutional Court left at
the end of the day, the other three judges affiliated to the
Sandinista party called three other Sandinista judges from
other court houses to vote on Ortega‘s request. In their
decision, they argued that the article of the Constitution
forbidding re-election was non-applicable. The tribunal
―allowed him to nominate himself to the presidency in
2011.‖20 This institutional coup allowed the Nicaraguan
president to concentrate more power and to be re-elected for
a third time, reminding us of Malaparte‘s description.
In these cases, more that coup attempts, the leader uses the
ghost of past coups to attack the opposition. Why does this
happen? Is it because there is a memory of horror of past
coups or, on the contrary, does it respond to the eternal
fragility of democracy?
Without underestimating the
corrosive instability job performed by many antagonists—
who generally are the same that have the economic and
multimedia power—invoking coups is a spurious political
resource. These attempts to limits the political activity,
demonize leaders, and promote hatred cannot lead to good
democratic governability.
POLITICAL CULTURE, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY
Democratic culture is not achieved in one game. Countries
that now enjoy cohesive political systems have achieved
democratic progress after huge social conflicts, intense
divisions, and profound exclusions. In Latin America, the
political culture inherited from so many years of
authoritarianism and impregnated with fear, still exists.
Order instead of freedom; discipline and hierarchy.
Disciplining social relations demands a privatization of

20

Mary Anastasia O‘Grady, ―Dónde está la indignación internacional
frente a Daniel Ortega?,‖ Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2010,
reproduced by Cato Institute, http://www.elcato.org/donde-estalaindignacion-internacional-frente-daniel-ortega.
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power.21 Threatening with the ghost of the coup d’état, both
by those in power as well as the opposition, seeks to scare
the citizens and isolate him in the face of potential chaos.
Francis Fukuyama argues that ―political culture varies
among different people and regions and through time; it is
influenced not only by symbolic forces like religion but also
by historical experiences like wars or economic crisis and is
crucial to understand why some formal political institutions
function and others do not.‖22
That culture inclined to
dramatic solutions, which erase the past and continuously
reestablishes the ―the nation‘s‖ foundation is rooted in
military institutions. The incomplete control of the armed
forces opened a window of opportunity for their return as
saviors of the fatherland. In addition, this failed civil
supremacy also allowed for the armed forces to be repoliticized and to be used as a political party ally for new
political projects. This will work until the military consider
that they want to be protagonists for change. But this culture
is also rooted in political leaders. Their careers are
determined by territorial power. To reassert themselves, they
resort to caudillo-like practices such as political vengeance
or, if necessary, palace coups. There are very few Latin
American nations where the principle of freedom and
democracy, the Parliamentarian state, is a shared consensus,
and it is respected by the political elite. Citizens emerge from
societies where rule of law is respected.
We are witnessing with consternation an unceasing increase
of violence that results in the beheading of citizens in
Mexico, territorial control of neighborhoods in Rio de
21

José Joaquín Brunner (1982) ―La cultura política del autoritarismo,‖
Revista Mexicana de Sociología, (Vol. 44, No. 2, Apr-Jun, (Mexico,
National Autnomous University of Mexico) pp. 550-575.
22
Francis Fukuyama (2008) ―Do defective institutions explain the
development gap between the United States and Latin America? In
Francis Fukuyama, editor (2008) Falling behind. Explaining the
development gap between Latin America and the United States (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press), p. 213.
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Janeiro, and that frustrates authorities in El Salvador and
Honduras. Behind this violence, there is no poverty but
inequality and a strong correlation between the rates of
political and criminal violence. In Latin America, the
threshold of violence is higher than in other societies on the
world. Governments fail to set an example by establishing a
culture of debate, consensus, and transparency. On the
contrary, the culture of intolerance, demonization of the
opposition and the utilization of any method to achieve
power prevails. This culture is inclined to disproportionate
political expressions. It accepts that the resolution of
conflicts and the response to demands should be through
confrontational means. Within this scenario, redeeming,
messianic and mythical solutions are promoted. Among
these solutions, the assault on power cannot be discarded.
Indexes of support for democracy in Latin America are not
negative.23 Nevertheless, social and political condemnations
of political adventurisms have been practically absent.
Against this environment of intransigence and
preponderance, we should not be surprised that coup d’états
will continue taking place in Latin America.

23

See, Mitchell A. Seligson and Amy Erica Smith (editors) (2010).
―Political Culture of Democracy, 2010. Democratic Consolidation in the
Americas in Hard Times: report on the Americas,‖ Americas Barometer,
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), (Nashville, Tennessee,
Vanderbilt University).
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Coups in Latin America:
Old and New Threats
Prof. Pablo Policzer
University of Calgary (Canada)
Democracy has a stronger foothold in Latin America today
than in the past, when elections were rare and power in some
countries regularly changed hands through coups. Over the
past generation countries in the region and international
organizations such as the Organization of American States
(OAS) have enshrined protections to strengthen democratic
regimes. Democratic transfers of power are the norm, and
democracy is entrenched as a fundamental value. Yet a
number of crises in recent years have raised new fears about
the strength of democratic safeguards, and even about the
renewed threat of coups. In this brief I will argue that this
threat requires focusing on undemocratic elements embedded
in many countries‘ constitutions, as well as defining coups in
a novel way.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUP
What is a coup? In the standard view, a coup is a blow
against democratic constitutional government. In a classic
and oft-cited treatise, Edward Luttwak defines a coup as an
illegal seizure of power.24 Similarly, Maxwell Cameron
argues that ―a coup is, by definition, a change in the
constitutional order by non-constitutional means.‖25 This
change can include the overthrow of a democratically elected
president by the military (as in Chile in 1973), as well as the
24

Edward Luttwak, Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook (Harvard
University Press, 1968).
25
Maxwell Cameron, ―A Coup is a Coup is a Coup,‖ The Mark, October
13, 2009 http://www.themarknews.com/articles/568-a-coup-is-a-coup-isa-coup.(accessed February 8, 2011).
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unconstitutional suspension of the constitution by a sitting
executive (as in Peru in 1992).
If constitutional government is government of laws that limit
power according to democratic checks and balances, it seems
right to define a coup as the overthrow of constitutional
government. Such an overthrow must, by definition, be
unconstitutional. From this perspective, a ―constitutional
coup‖ would be an oxymoron, because constitutional
government cannot constitute its own overthrow. 26
The standard view is widely accepted, and is also embedded
in the most significant international mechanism protecting
against coups in Latin America: the Inter-American
Democratic Charter stipulates that ―an unconstitutional
interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional
alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs
the democratic order in a member state, constitutes, while it
persists, an insurmountable obstacle to its government‘s
participation [as a member of the OAS].‖ The Charter does
not define an ―interruption or alteration,‖ but the broad
outlines are reasonably clear. Through the Charter, the OAS
can legitimately exert pressure on states that experience not
only interruptions of democracy such as military coups, but
also alterations such as the arbitrary dismissal of the
legislature or the judiciary by a sitting president (a ―selfcoup‖, such as Alberto Fujimori‘s in Peru in 199227).
The Charter does not clarify what is and isn‘t constitutional,
yet from the perspective of the standard view, we might
assume this to be unproblematic. If a coup is ―a change in the
constitutional order by non-constitutional means‖, a coup is
by definition unconstitutional and hence a legitimate reason
to trigger the Charter and mobilize the OAS to resist it.
26

Cameron (ibid.) argues that the constitutional coup concept ―has no
place in law or scholarship‖.
27
See Maxwell A. Cameron, ―Self-Coups: Peru, Guatemala and Russia,‖
Journal of Democracy 9:1 (1998), pp. 125-39.
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There are two important reasons to question the standard
view, however, and along with it the assumption it imposes
on the Charter:
First, constitutions and constitutional orders are not the same
thing. All states are a type of constitutional order, insofar as
they are ―constituted‖ in some form. Most states also have a
constitution of some sort, but constitutions can differ from
constitutional orders. Constitutions specify the terms under
which a constitutional order functions. They are usually
(though not always) written documents, which contain
provisions for how authorities can exercise power in a wide
range of possible circumstances. A constitutional coup is
indeed an oxymoron if ―constitutional‖ refers to the
constitutional order. A constitutional order cannot overthrow
itself. But if ―constitutional‖ refers to the constitution instead
of the constitutional order—then a different set of
possibilities arises.
This becomes evident in the second reason to question the
standard assumption, which is that most constitutions contain
provisions for the suspension of basic constitutional
guarantees, including core rights and freedoms. Such ―states
of exception‖ are exercised in times of emergency, such as
wars, insurrections or natural disasters. Constitutions can
give officials, such as presidents, extraordinary powers to
suspend basic rights and freedoms, or ordinary government
procedures, or both. In some constitutions states of
exception are limited, and provide clear mechanisms for
oversight (such as by the other branches of government). But
other constitutions permit broader suspensions, with less
oversight. Historically, Latin American constitutions have
granted executives a great deal of power, with very limited
oversight in times of crisis. And they have also granted
similar kinds of power to the armed forces, especially by
giving them the responsibility to act as the ―guarantors‖ of
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the constitutional order.28 When executives can assume
absolute or near absolute power, or when the armed forces
have the mandate to guarantee the constitutional order, a
constitutional coup is no longer an oxymoron. A president
can rule without constraints based on powers granted in the
constitution, and the armed forces can overthrow a
government for the purpose of protecting the constitutional
order.
This is not simply a matter of purely theoretical concern, or a
past problem that has little contemporary relevance. A
number of contemporary issues underscore the constitutional
coup threat in Latin America:
 The 2009 coup against Honduran President Manuel
Zelaya by the armed forces with the support of the
Congress and the Supreme Court, for the purpose of
protecting the constitution. The OAS argued that the
coup was clearly unconstitutional and on the basis of
the Inter-American Democratic Charter suspended
Honduras. A sober assessment reveals that the
Honduran constitution contains provisions supporting
both the OAS‘s position, along with that of the group
that overthrew Zelaya, which produced a
constitutional crisis. Yet Honduran constitution, in
granting the armed forces the power to act as
guarantors of the constitutional order, contributed to
the coup.29

28

For a history of these provisions in Latin American constitutions, see
Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny (University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1993).
29
For a more detailed analysis of how the Honduran constitution
contributed to the crisis and the coup, see Pablo Policzer, ―The Next
Stage of Democracy Promotion,‖ Canadian Foundation for the Americas
(FOCAL) Policy Brief, July 2010: http://www.focal.ca/publications/156policy-papers-briefs; and Antonio Franceschet and Pablo Policzer,
―Taking Constitutions Seriously: International Democracy Promotion
After Honduras,‖ University of Calgary, Unpublished manuscript, 2011.
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 In December 2010 the Venezuelan Congress granted
President Hugo Chávez an ―enabling law‖, allowing
him to govern by decree for a period of 18 months.
This law was one of the last acts of the outgoing
Congress, controlled by pro-Chávez forces. In the
incoming Congress opposition groups gained enough
seats to remove Chávez‘s two-third ―super majority.‖
The enabling law was passed ostensibly to deal with
the natural disasters caused by very heavy rains, but
it essentially grants Chávez the power to rule without
constraint from the opposition, which has gained
seats in the new Congress. The OAS has declared
that the enabling law contravenes the terms of the
Inter-American Democratic Charter, which would
mean the law is unconstitutional. Yet while the law is
certainly undemocratic, it is based on particular
constitutional provisions allowing Congress to grant
such power to the President, which the Venezuelan
Congress has done in the past. While Chávez has not
taken unlimited power for an indefinite period of
time, he has removed the important check and
balance of Congressional oversight, and done so on
the basis of the Venezuelan Constitution.
 The Ecuadorian constitution also gives the President
a potentially similar kind of power. In the event of a
conflict between the Executive and Legislative
branches, the President can end the mandate of both
the Congress and the Presidency, yet continue to rule
until the next scheduled elections (in which the
president is allowed to run). In that interim period the
president assumes full legislative faculties, meaning
the ability to rule without congressional oversight.
Analysts have pointed out that using this
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constitutional faculty would turn the president into a
virtual dictator.30
 In 2010 a general in the Venezuelan armed forces
indicated that the military would not accept an
opposition victory in the next presidential elections,
scheduled for 2012. Such a declaration certainly
violates the Constitution‘s stipulation that the
military is a professional and non-political institution
(Art. 328), but is consistent with the fundamental
Constitutional principle that Venezuela is a
Bolivarian Republic (Art. 1), which would preclude
the occupation of the Presidency by a candidate from
an opposition non-Bolivarian party.31
 A number of constitutions in the region have similar
language regarding the status of the armed forces.
Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution states that
the military is ―under the supreme authority of the
President of the Republic,‖ yet also that its mission is
to ―guarantee the constitutional powers.‖ Article 217
of the Colombian Constitution states that the mandate
of the armed forces is to defend the ―constitutional
order‖.32

30

See Simon Pachano, ―Insubordinación y Muerte Cruzada,‖ Infolatam,
September 30, 2010 (http://www.infolatam.com/2010/09/30/ecuadorinsubordinacion-y-muerte-cruzada/; accessed February 10, 2011).
31
OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza has warned that such
threats are unacceptable and run counter to the democratic principles
embodied in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. President Chávez
has promoted the general in question
(http://www.infolatam.com/2010/11/14/venezuela-chavez-asciende-algeneral-rangel-tras-sus-amenazas-si-ganase-la-oposicion/;
http://noticias.latino.msn.com/latinoamerica/articulos.aspx?cpdocumentid=26528647; both accessed February 12, 2011).
32
The Chilean Constitution contained a similar provision (in Article 90,
which stipulated that the military‘s mandate was to guarantee the
constitutional order), but this was removed in 2005 as part of a set of
constitutional reforms.
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One possible response to these threats is to suggest that the
countries of the hemisphere must close ranks in defense of
democracy, according to the terms of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter. The premise of this position is that the
mechanisms for the defense of democracy in the region are
clear, and that only mustering sufficient political will to
implement them is required. While the OAS has signaled its
interest in improving some aspects of the Charter,33 it has
ignored the problem of violations to democracy stemming
from within the region‘s own constitutions. As suggested
here, these provisions create the conditions for a
constitutional crisis, as in Honduras, or open the door to the
exercise of constitutional authoritarianism, as in Venezuela
or other countries. It makes little sense to define the problem
away by ruling out ex-ante the possibility of a constitutional
coup. When executives or the military take absolute power,
even temporarily, based on provisions in the constitution,
they are staging a constitutional coup. But how should we
define a coup in order to make sense of this very real threat?
A NEW DEFINITION FOR COUPS
Instead of defining the problem away (by thinking of a coup
as an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional order),
an alternative is to define a coup as a transformation of
limited into absolute power. This transformation need not be
permanent, and it need not be quick, but what distinguishes a
coup is the concentration of absolute power, usually by
removing democratic checks and balances. Coups can be
constitutional or unconstitutional. It is always possible for an
actor to take and concentrate power unconstitutionally. But if
a constitution stipulates that actors such as executives or the
military under some conditions can exercise absolute power,
it is reasonable and not an oxymoron to call this a
constitutional coup. Coups are not the same as emergency
powers or states of exception, although they can be related.
33

For example, to allow other institutions besides the Executive of the
country in question to invoke the Charter.
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A democratic state of exception stipulates strict limits on
(usually) executive power in times of crisis. State of
exception provisions that do not stipulate such limits create
the conditions for a constitutional coup.
Limited and absolute power are opposite ends along a
continuum, where any number of configurations may be
possible. A regime can move gradually along this
continuum, and slide toward the concentration of power. If
that slide toward absolute power is based on constitutional
provisions, the regime can experience a constitutional coup
in slow motion.
Through the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the
member states of the OAS have defended themselves against
an ―unconstitutional alteration or interruption to the
democratic order.‖ But the Charter defines away the problem
of constitutional coups: constitutional alterations or
interruptions, which result in undemocratic concentrations of
power. In some cases these may be a more serious threat to
democracy, given the provisions for authoritarian
concentration of power embedded throughout some of the
region‘s constitutions. Strengthening democracy will require
addressing this blind spot, and reforming the undemocratic
provisions in many of the region‘s constitutions.
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Can Coups Still Take Place
in Latin America?
Dr. Michael Shifter
Inter-American Dialogue
(Washington, DC)
It has been two decades since the military forcibly ousted an
elected, civilian government in Latin America and the
Caribbean and actually assumed and exercised full authority.
Such a traditional coup scenario took place in Haiti in 1991;
prior to that, one would have to go back to Argentina in
1976.
By any historical measure that is an impressive
stretch of time that reflects well on the region‘s democratic
progress.
Yet, though surely significant, the fact that a military regime
is not in control anywhere in the region today is hardly cause
for celebration. Elections are, happily, routine, and have
become the only acceptable way of achieving legitimacy.
But the last two decades have witnessed a number of cases of
governments whose legal terms were interrupted, serious
aberrations in democratic rule, and significant weakening of
fundamental institutions.
Indeed, there has been a string of interruptions of democratic
rule in which leaders were deposed by extra-constitutional
means. There is reason to believe such interruptions -- some
of which certainly qualify as coups – will continue to take
place in some Latin American countries in the future.
Less than a year after Haiti‘s traditional coup came the ―selfcoup‖ engineered by elected Peruvian president Alberto
Fujimori, who proceeded to dissolve the Congress and
suspend the constitution. And the most recent illustration
28

was the 2009 Honduras situation that in some respects
recalled a traditional military coup, even though the armed
forces did not take power but rather quickly ceded to a de
facto government.
In both the Peruvian and Honduran examples (as well as
Haiti) there was a strong reaction from other democratic
hemispheric governments (in the case of Honduras the
response was particularly severe and resulted in the
country‘s expulsion from the Organization of American
States (OAS). But other instances in which governments
that were ousted by force barely elicited any response from
multilateral organizations.
Street mobilizations forced
Bolivian president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to leave the
presidency in October 2003, yet few referred to what
happened as a coup.
Ecuador most clearly exemplifies the view that whether or
not a challenge to democratic rule is dealt with as a coup is
less a result of some rigorous, consistently applied definition
than the politics that surrounds the situation. Arguably in
several instances in Ecuador -- including in 1997, 2000 and
particularly in 2005 – democratically elected governments
were forced out, and at least in two of those cases the armed
forces played the role of final arbiter.
Yet, prevailing regional politics -- along with the nature and
politics of the coup itself -- were not conducive to any
serious response by other hemispheric governments. At the
same time, in late September 2010 there was essentially a
police uprising that generated a strong response (even if one
was not really warranted) and was characterized as a coup,
not only by the OAS but also the Community of South
American Nations or UNASUR. In some cases a coup took
place but was not described as such, whereas another case
was deemed a coup though it is not clear one occurred.
Whether a legitimate, elected government is forcibly ousted
by Congress (Ecuador 1997), the street (Bolivia 2003) or the
29

military (Honduras 2009), such coups or interruptions are
highly problematic and repeatedly reveal the extreme
fragility of democratic institutions in a half dozen or so of
Latin American countries. Electoral processes may have
improved in many respects, but in some nations the rule of
law and judicial systems remain deficient, and Congress and
political parties are extremely weak and incoherent. In these
countries, which tend to have chronic governance
difficulties, there are good reasons to expect future coups,
particularly if economic and social conditions deteriorate.
In addition, there is another kind of phenomenon that can
aptly be described as a coup as well – and that does not
necessarily involve any change in government. Some
analysts have referred to ―slow-motion‖ coups in such
countries as Nicaragua and Venezuela, where elected
presidents proceed to systematically concentrate power and
display disdain for democratic institutions and independent
powers of government. In some respects, these cases
resemble the characteristics of Fujimori in Peru in the 1990s.
Nicaragua‘s Daniel Ortega, elected president in 2006, has
dismantled any checks on his power and presided over local
elections widely deemed to be fraudulent.
In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez represents an extreme case, in
which democratic norms and practices have been
progressively subverted. The latest example is a set of laws,
passed by a lame duck, Chavez-controlled National
Assembly that gives Chavez decree authority for some
eighteen months. Though the April 2002 short-lived coup
against Chavez produced a strong reaction by the
hemispheric community, the significant violations of his own
1999 constitution have met with a tepid response at best
outside of Venezuela.
Chavez‘s regime, markedly
militarized and contemptuous of the rule of law, faces scant
external pressure.
Unless the politics are aligned (as was the case in Honduras
in June 2009), there otherwise seems to be less and less
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appetite among regional bodies such as the OAS to take
forceful action in response to coups of whatever kind. In
September 2011, the Inter-American Democratic Charter,
which codified all of the OAS instruments and declarations
regarding the defense of democracy in the Americas, will
mark its first decade. The instruments and framework are
highly developed, and were fashioned in response to the
Fujimori experience (beyond the 1992 ―self-coup‖) in Peru,
where the Charter was signed by the hemisphere‘s
democratically elected governments.
But unfortunately in recent years the collective will in the
Americas to apply the instruments in accordance with some
consistent standards and criteria has eroded. Among the
region‘s countries that have experienced democratic progress
such as Chile and Brazil there is no support for the situations
of strongman rule in such countries as Nicaragua and
Venezuela. At the same time, however, arguments about
sovereignty and non-intervention are frequently invoked to
justify inaction.
Coups of some kind should be expected in Latin America in
coming years not only because fundamental institutions
remain weak in some countries but because the regional
political environment is less prepared to respond effectively
to transgressions than it was a few years ago. The good
news, however, is that only a handful of countries are at risk,
and that the militaries, even in those countries, show no
interest in governing. The bad news is that in those few
countries where situations are indeed shaky, they are also in
some cases aggravated by rising food and fuel prices, and
spreading criminality, which pose serious risks to the rule of
law and democratic governance.
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